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Introduction 
Risk analysis is a discipline, which has constantly been gaining interest 
over the last two to three decades among the process industry 
community. Especially, the major industrial accidents that occurred 
during the years, as the major accidents in Seveso (1976), Bhopal and 
Mexico City (1984), and Flixborough (1974), contributed to that 
interest. Risk analysis is a very complex discipline. During the 
investigation of a chemical plant, to fulfil the objectives for a specific 
risk analysis, the analysts have to deal with a wide variety of aspects 
ranging from organisational to technical items. Nowadays, a risk 
analysis is often demanded by the national or local authorities to judge 
the safety level and thus the acceptability to continue operation of a 
specific plant. It is also in the interest of the managers of a plant to 
minimise stops in production and of course to avoid incidents, which 
might harm the staff. The situation in which the risk analysis approach 
is applied is often in the design phase of the construction of a plant or 
when certain changes on an existing plant are under consideration. A 
full-scale risk analysis includes the following topics: 
 
 
accident identification  to  find the parts of the installation, wh ch 
are of importance with respect to safety. 
This includes the quantities and properties 
of chemicals used. 
analysis of accident scenarios to describe the possible modes how an 
accident is developing e.g.: a malfunction 
in a valve triggers other failure modes 
and gives a release of a dangerous 
compound to the environment threatening 
humans  
analysis of frequencies and 
consequences 
the accident scenarios are analysed more 
thoroughly. The probability of a scenario 
occurring and consequences of the 
scenario are calculated. The 
consequences are often measured as 
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impact on human health or mortality. Also 
the environmental impacts might be a 
measure.   
evaluation of the total risk the final evaluation of the risk includes a 
ranking of the scenarios found and might 
be expressed as a sum of the risk of all the 
scenarios. The probabilistic approach will 
define the risk as the product of the 
frequencies and the consequences. The 
deterministic approach is based on the 
possible consequences only. 
 
 
Different approaches are applied in the European countries. In some 
countries a probabilistic approach is used describing the risk as a 
function of the consequences and the frequency of an incident. Usually 
the function is expressed as the simple product of the consequenc s i.e. 
expressed as the societal risk times the frequency of the incident to 
occur. Sometimes the consequences are weighted more than the 
frequencies to enhance accidents with catastrophic consequences but 
low frequencies. In other countries a deterministic approach is used 
focusing on the consequences of an accident.  
 
All the different topics and philosophies will give rise to some 
uncertainty, which might influence the final outcome in the ranking of 
the accidents. Therefore, it has been stated elsewhere that "Risk 
analysis of technical systems is more an art than an exact scientific 
discipline" This rather provocative statement is characterising another 
situation one has to deal with during a risk analysis. That is the 
problem of complexity. Real plants are usually very complex and a risk 
analysis has to cover not only the technical implementation with all its 
single components and controlling equipment, but also the system as a 
whole with the various interactions of components and acting / reacting 
human beings. Thus skills, organisational culture and (safety) 
management related topics have also to be considered. Not to speak 
about the specific meteorological and environmental conditions and 
interacting /interfering technical systems which are not directly part of 
the plant in the specific analysis. To be able to deal with this 
complexity it is important to make simplifications, which should make 
the risk analysis operational. The art in this sense is to find 
simplifications e.g. scenarios that are valid for the specific processes 
and representative for the overall risk at the site. 
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The project 
On that background the EU-benchmarking project ASSessment of 
Uncertainties in Risk Analysis of Chemical Establishments or its 
acronym ASSURANCE has been established in 1998 (ENV4-CT97-
0627) aiming to improve the understanding of the sources and types of 
the uncertainties connected with a risk analysis. The project is partially 
funded by the European Commission, under the Environment and 
Climate Programme of the Commission’s Fourth Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development. A better 
understanding of the uncertainties in risk analysis is an important and 
actual subject. According to the EU’s Seveso directives, its is 
obligatory for process plants and /or storing facilities dealing with 
dangerous substances (defined in the directives) to provide a risk 
analysis to the competent authorities. Therefore, it is of European 
interest to secure that these analyses are as uniform as possible in the 
different EU countries. 
 
The objective of the ASSURANCE project is to address the 
uncertainties within the different topics or stages of a risk analysis. 
About 10 years ago a similar project was performed. The Benchmark 
Exercise on Major Hazards Analysis (BEMHA)1) was carried out 
during the period 1988-1990 under the co-ordination of the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), and partial funding of the European 
Commission, with the participation of 11 teams from several EU 
countries. At that time very large differences in the final outcome of 
the risk analyses were observed, but in this former benchmark exercise 
it was not possible to analyse the sources of uncertainty in sufficient 
details. This will be pursued within the ASSURANCE project. 
 
The project is subdivided into three phases, a qualitative analysis, a 
quantitative assessment and the investigation of specific case studies, 
respectively. Between these phases workshops are organised to discuss 
the results in great detail and to be able to evaluate the uncertainties for 
every phase. This also includes that after the end of a specific phase a 
new common basis for the next one is established to prevent that 
possible misunderstanding might influence the following phases of the 
analysis. 
 
The different phases have the following objectives: 
 
a) the qualitative phase is meant to make analysts familiar 
with the plant and to identify the risk and possible 
failure types with a method chosen by each of the 
                                         
1 Contini, A. Amendola and I. Ziomas: Benchmark exercise on Major Hazard Analysis: Vol1. 
Description of the project, comparison of the results and conclusions. EUR 13386 EN (1991)
A. Amendola, S. Contini and I. Ziomas: Uncertainties in chemical risk assessment: Results of a 
European benchmark exercise.  The Journal of Hazardous Materials. 29 (1992) 347-363 
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participants. This outcome will be evaluated and will 
be further used as a basis to define the input for the 
next phase. 
 
b) the quantitative phase in which the outcome of the risk 
calculations are compared with each other. The 
calculations are based on a number of scenarios agreed 
on at the workshop for the qualitative analysis. This 
will result in a comparison of different approaches to 
assess the risk induced by a specific accident scenario. 
 
c) last, the third phase will be the detailed calculation of 
some specific cases studies which might be e.g. a 
release of ammonia through a hole under certain 
conditions. These case studies will give insight in the 
uncertainties connected with numerical calculations 
and models for the description of physical phenomena, 
e.g. atmospheric dispersion codes. 
 
 
The partners 
The ASSURANCE project is a co-operation of nine institutions from 
seven European countries. The partners with large experience in risk 
assessment participate in the project under the joint co-ordination by 
Risø National Laboratory and the EU’s Joint Research Centre, JRC. 
The participants are: 
 
· Det Norske Veritas , Ltd. , United Kingdom 
· Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom 
· INERIS, France 
· NCSR Demokritos, Greece 
· TNO, The Netherlands 
· Universitá di Bologna, Italy 
· VTT, Finland 
· JRC Ispra, Italy 
· Risø National Laboratory, Denmark  
 
 
The reference plant 
As a reference plant an ammonia storage facility has been chosen, 
including a pressurised and a cryogenic storage. Real installations have 
been chosen to make the ASSURANCE project as realistic as possible. 
The participants have visited the plant once for a two days period 
during the “documentation and plant familiarisation” phase of the 
project. Prior to that visit all participants had the opportunity to get 
familiar – at some extent – with the plant reading the provided 
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documentation. The on-site visit was followed by an extensive 
“questions-and-answers” procedure, while issues not resolved even 
after this procedure were addressed by adopting commo  assumptions. 
Nevertheless, as the plant information is confidential, the storage plants 
have been anonymised by the invention of virtual surroundings and 
virtual meteorological conditions. The virtual map with the reference 
location and surroundings of the site is shown in figure 1.
 
 
The status of the project 
At present, the hazard identification and qualitative analysis phase of 
the project has been completed and the results are being analysed. The 
objectives of this phase are to assess the state-of-the-art in hazard 
identification, to get insights in the various techniques used, to reveal 
and investigate any discrepancies in the scenarios identified and to 
assess their impact in the following phases of the project.  
 
The partners used a number of different techniques. These include 
HAZOP, Master Logic Diagram (MLD), Structured What-IF 
Technique (SWIFT), Hazard Identification by Area Audit (HIAA), 
Function analysis and Hazard and Consequences Analysis, HAZard 
Screening Analysis (HAZSCAN), and the use of (national) standard 
checklists based on accumulated experience from past accidents and 
past studies. These methods have significant differences but also 
similarities. In an attempt to categorise them, three groups may be 
distinguished: 
 
· Methods based on a top-down analysis, mainly represented by the 
Master Logic Diagram, which has a form similar to Fault Trees, 
starting from a top event and going down to combinations of basic 
events, capable to provoke an accident. 
· Methods based on a bottom-up analysis, like HAZOP, SWIFT, 
HAZSCAN and FMEA, which investigate whether deviations of 
the process variables and failures of individual devices can provoke 
a major accident. 
· Methods based on the systematic use of standard checklists, after 
division of the plant in areas. Here, the accumulated experience 
from past accidents and studies is combined with systemat c rules 
to identify the areas that deserve a more detailed analysis. 
 
At the moment, the results of the quantitative phase are finalised by the 
partners and will be compared during spring. The case studies, the 
comparison of all the results and the dissemination of results are 
expected to be finished up to the end the year.  
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Figure 1 Virtual location and surroundings of ammonia storage plant 
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